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The question: Does violence establish property rights? 
Historians of law and anthropologists have identified several features of 
international law. It requires a ratified -preferably a written- set of statutes, a 
generally recognized authority that can force conflicting parties to accept these 
rules and can impose sanctions on the party that violates them, and the con­
sistent application of these statutes.1 A ratified, generally accepted and writ­
ten set of statutes regulating interstate conduct does not seem to have existed 
in ancient Greece, and the only authority that was believed to have ultimately 
controlled and sanctioned the deeds of the mortals was that of the gods. Yet, 
despite the lack of a written set of statutes, the Hellenistic Greeks treated 
the violent occupation of territory in such a consistent way that we have to 
assume that they had clearly defined concepts and principles, although they 
were equally weak in implementing decisions based on these principles as the 
modern instruments of international law are today. 
Indeed, it would be surprising if the Greeks had not developed concepts 
concerning problems with which they were continually confronted. Phenom­
ena such as the violent occupation of territory, raids, the seizure of persons, or 
the treatment of prisoners already occupy a prominent position in our earliest 
literary and documentary sources.2 The subject of violence in "international 
1. E. M . Harris, "Antigone the Lawyer, or the Ambiguities of Nomos", in E.M. Harris and L. Ru-
benstein (eds.), Law and Courts in Ancient Greece, London, 2004, p. 19-56. 
2. For the occupation of territory see more recently J . -M. Bertrand, Territoire donne, territoire 
attribu6: note sur la pratique de l'attribution dans le monde imperial de Rome", Cahiers du centre 
Gustavc-Glotz, 2,1991, p. 131 -4; L. Boffo, "Lo statute di terre, insediamenti e persone nell'Anatolia 
ellenistica. Documenti recenti eproblemi antichi", Dike, 4,2001, p. 233-55; A. Chaniotis, "Justifying 
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law" gained great prominence in the Hellenistic period. More wars were fought 
in this period than in any other earlier period, more territories changed hands 
violently than ever before, and naturally more sources survive: proxeny decrees 
that guarantee asphaleia and asylia, decrees that recognize the inviolability of 
poleis and sanctuaries, treaties regulating international arbitration, protocols 
of arbitrations, documents concerning the abuse of power by garrison soldiers 
etc. This documentation shows that the Hellenistic Greeks were continually 
confronted with the problem of violence in their interstate contacts. And yet 
we receive litde information about a systematic treatment of this subject in 
public discourse. 
One of the few exceptions is the protocolle of an arbitration of Magnesia on 
the Maeander between the Cretan cities of Hierapytna and Itanos (112 BC),3 in 
which we find a plaidoyer for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, a condemna-
tion of conflicts and a praise of peace and concord; just as circumstances often 
bring even the closest relatives into conflict, it is the duty of their friends to try 
their best to reconcile them (lines 14-17); this is the reason why the Magne-
sians had willingly accepted the task of resolving the dispute. When the judges' 
final effort to reconcile the Hierapytnians and the Itanians failed, they were 
left with no other choice than to give a verdict which opens with a theoretical 
statement about the arguments that can be used to support a claim of owner-
ship (kyrieia) over land: 
Men have proprietary rights over land either because they have received the land 
themselves from their ancestors, or because they have bought it for money, or 
because they have won it by the spear, or because they have received it from 
someone of the mightier. 
Territorial Claims in Classical and Hellenistic Greece", in E .M. Harris and L. Rubenstein (eds.), 
Law and Courts in Ancient Greece, London, 2004, p. 185-212. For raids and seizures see B. Bravo, 
"Sulan. Represailles et justice privee contre des etrangers dans les cites grecques», ASNP, 10, 1980, 
p. 675-987. For captives see A . Bielman, Retour a la liberte. Liberation et sauvetage desprisonniers en 
Grece ancienne, Paris, 1994. For the treatment of prisoners of war see P. Ducrey, Le traitement des 
prisonniers de guerre dans la Grece antique des origines a la conquete romaine, Paris, 1999. 
3. /. Cret. I l l iv 9. Recent edition o f the entire document and bibliography: S.L. Ager, Inter-
state Arbitration in the Greek World, 337-90 BC, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1996, no. 158 II 
(cited as Ager, Arbitration). For a more detailed discussion of the legal aspects of this text see 
J . -M. Bertrand.arf.cit.,p. 126-45;F. Guizzi,"Conquista,occupazionedelsuoloetitolichedanno 
diritto alia proprieta: l'esemio di uno controversia interstatale cretese", Athenaeum, 85, 1997, 
p. 35-52; A . Chaniotis, art. tit; see also L. Boffo, art. tit., p. 237. Cf. A . Mehl, "AoptKTnTos" 
Xwpa. Kritische Bemerkungen zum Speererwerb in Politik und Volkerrecht der hellenistischen 
Epoche", Ancient Society, 11/12, p. 206f. 
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Inheritance, purchase, and donation are three undisputed modes of acqui-
sition of property;4 at first sight, the judges regarded conquest, the violent 
occupation of what belonged to another community, as one of the legitimate 
means of acquisition of property, without any further specification. Most of 
the Greeks would not have been shocked by such a statement. The national 
legends of most Greek communities contained a successful act of violence 
that had established its ownership of its territory. Aristotle himself recognized 
war as one of the skills by which men acquire the ownership of goods {Pol. II 
1256b23). It is not hard to find further evidence in the Classical period for 
the belief that victory in war legitimizes the possession of the property of the 
defeated party. Thucydides, e.g., claims that according to the customary law 
of the Greeks the successful use of violence establishes rights: 
The Greeks have a law (nomos) that whoever has under his power (kratos) a piece of 
land, whether big or small, also owns (gignesthat) the sanctuaries, managing them 
in the same manner as before to the best of his ability. For the Boeotians, as well as 
most other men, have used violence to expel another group of people and now hold 
{nemontat) their land, having as their own {pikeia kekteisthai) those sanctuaries, 
which belonged to others (aUotriois) when they first came upon them.5 
The object taken violendy by means of conquest becomes the property 
(pikeia kekteisthai) of the victorious party.6 We find the same idea in a letter 
contained in the corpus of Demosthenes' orations and attributed to Philip; 
it concerns Philip's claims on Amphipolis. The letter is probably not authen-
tic, but one observes that Philip's arguments find close parallels in arguments 
known from later documentary sources. The Macedonian king explains that 
three principles justify his claim: inheritance, conquest, and concession on the 
basis of a treaty: 
For if (Amphipolis) belongs to those who have taken control of it originally, then 
who can say that I do not possess it jusdy, since Alexander, my ancestor, occupied 
that place first? [...] But even if someone should dispute this and demands that 
it should belong to those who became its sovereign owners later, then I have this 
right as well. For I defeated after siege those who had expelled you and had been 
serried there by the Lacedaemonians, and captured the fort. Indeed, all of us inha-
bit our cities either because our ancestors have handed them over to us or because 
4. For examples see F. Guizzi, art. cit.; L. Boffo, art. cit.\ Chaniotis, art. cit. 
5. Thuc . 4.98.2-3: TOW 8e vo\iov TOTS "EXXTpiv elvai , <Lv fj TO KpaTo? Tfj? yf\s iK&cmy;, T\V 
T€ irXeoi'OS' f\v re 0paxvTepas\ TOVTWV Kal T& Wpd a i d ytyvecrfku, Tpoiroi? Qepa-nev6\ieva 
bis av upd TOO eloOoai Kal S w w r a i . Kal yap Boiurrou? KOI TOUS TOXAOUS' T&V a\k»v, 
oaoi e£ai>aa-rY|aaiTes' n v a (31a v e u o i r a i yi\v, dXXoTploi? lepots TO -npurrov emXQovras 
oUeTa vw KeKTf|O-0ai. 
6. Cf . Xen. , Cyr. paed., 7.5.73: Kal uTioel? ye b\idiv ex a ) l ' Tafrra v o u i a d r a d\X6Tpta l \ t l v ' 
v6(io? y d p iv -rraaiv dy6puiTroi? dl8i6? eorii>, brav TroXenouvrcov TTOXL? dXai TUV eX6vru)v 
Aval Kal TO ato^aTa j&v iv Tfj Tr6Xei Kal Td x p i f a 0 ™ -
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we have become their sovereign owners in war... Which other possession can be 
more secure than the possession (of Amphipolis), which was originally occupied 
by our ancestors, and became again ours in war, and thirdly was conceded (to us) 
by you, who have the habit of laying claim even to the cities which have nothing 
to do with you?7 
We encounter in this text a combination of three different justifications: 
original occupation, conquest in war, recognition in a treaty.8 The combina-
tion of different justifications, each one of them refering to a different time, 
presupposes that the claim on property is subject to changes: an inherited or 
purchased object may change its owner through an act of violence; and this 
act of violence may be later ratified by means of a contract. 
T h e terminus a quo 
A crucial consequence stems from the fact that property is subject to 
changes by different means (purchase, conquest, donation, inheritence): in 
order to answer the question who is the legitimate owner of a territory one 
needs first to determine a terminus a quo. 
The Hellenistic Greeks and the Romans did draw this conclusion and in 
many documents concerning arbitration we find explicit references to the 
historical moment which should be the basis of a verdict.9 In the disputes for 
7. D e m . 12.21f.: . . . elre yap TUV e£ apx f j s Kpamr|advTiov yiyveTaL, TT<3? oil Siica ios 1)\Leis 
aird]v e x 0 ^ " . 'AXefdi^pou TOII i rpoyowu TrpcoTou KaTaax6vros' rbv T6TTOV... etre TOOTCUV 
pkv d(i<f>iapT|Ti!|aei^ TIS\ d f io l Se ylyveaQai TUV tiarepov •yeyeirmii'ajv Kiiptcuv, irrrdpxei uoi 
Kai roirro T6 8IKOUOV eKnoh.opidpas yap TOVS f]p.as e(3aX6iras, ircro AcuceSaiiiov tan> 8c 
KaToiKiaeevra?, eXaPov T6 x^plov- K a ' roi iravTe? otKoup.ev ras TroXeis- f\ ru>v i r p o y o v w 
t rapaSo i rw i ' f \ Kcrrd mSXejiov Kupioi KaTacrrdi'Tes [...] Kai TOL V&S av tripa yevoi-ro fiefSai-
o-repa Taurris icrfjais, Tfjs T6 \iev dpxn? KaTaXr|<f>8ei a r p f\\dv imb r&v npcrybvwv, irdXii' 
8e icaTd ir6Xejiov e p % •yevei/r)|ievr|s, rptroi ' 8e airyx^pilSet OT|? ixj>' -f\\x&v T<M> e t O i a p i v w 
a\i<f>i<j$T\Teiv Kai T&V ou8ev i)\&v trpooT|KoOi'Tu>v. 
8. For a similar combination o f victory in war and recognition in a treaty see the letter o f Eumenes 
toTyriaion (SEGXLVU 1745 LL . 21f.): eKTriMivou Kvpiws 8id T6 irapd T<3V KpaTnowuoi ' Kai 
TToXenui K a l olwBriKaLS' elXn<f>£vai Tcojia oiv. 
9. A . J . Marshall, " T h e Survival and Development o f International Jurisdiction in the Greek Wor ld 
under Roman Rule", ANRW, 11.13, p. 6 4 8 f ; R. Scuderi, "Decreti del senato per controversie 
di confine in eta repubblicana", Athenaeum, 69, 1991, p. 371-415. (with further bibliography); 
K . Harter-Uibopuu, Das zwischenstaatliche Schiedsverfahren im achaischen Koinon. Zur friedlichen 
Streitbeilegung nach den epigraphischen QueUen, Koln-Weimar-Vienna, 1998, p. 170. In the conflict 
between Magnesia and Maeander (c. 175-160) the terminus a quo was the moment when Magnesia 
and Priene became allies o f the Romans: Ager, Arbitration, no. 120 II, lines 20-22. In the conflict 
between Melitaia and Narthakion (c. 140) it was the moment they were accepted as amid o f the 
Romans: Ager, Arbitration, no. 156. In the conflict o f Hierapytna and Itanos (140 and 112 BC) it 
was the coming o f Roman envoys in 140 BC; Ager, Arbitration, no. 1581, lines 21 f., 56 -9 ,64 -7 and 
II, lines 51-4. In the conflict o f Sparta and Messene (138 BC) it was the coming o f L. Mummius to 
Greece in 146 BC: Ager, Arbitration, no. 159, lines 52-5. 
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which we have sufficient documentation we may observe that the rights estab-
lished through violence are not subject to controversy; the real controversy is 
the determination of the terminus a quo. 
This is the way we should approach the negotiations between Antiochos HI 
and the Romans in 196 BC The Romans asked Antiochos to retire from the 
cities previously subject to Philip. According to Polybios (18.49-51) the sen-
ate's envoy, L. Cornelius Lentulus, argued as follows: "It was a ridiculous thing 
that Antiochos should come in when all was over and take the prizes they had 
gained in their war with Philip." When the Romans raised claim on these areas 
because of their victory over Philip V, Antiochos did not question this princi-
ple, he only moved the terminus a quo further to the past: another, earlier act 
of violence had established his claim, i.e. the victory of Seleukos I in 281 BC 
Again Polybios summarizes his argument (18.51): 
He said that he had crossed to Europe with his army for the purpose of recovering 
the Chersonese and the cities of Thrace, for he had a better tide to the soverei-
gnty of these places than anyone else. They originally formed part of Lysimachos' 
kingdom, but when Seleukos went to war with Lysimachos and conquered him 
in the war, the whole of Lysimachos' kingdom came to Seleukos by right of con-
quest. But during the years that followed, when his ancestors had their attention 
deflected elsewhere, first of all Ptolemy and the Philip had robbed (acf>eTep aacr 
8ai) them of those places and appropriated them. At present he was not possessing 
himself of them by taking advantage of Philip's difficulties, but he was repossessing 
of them by his right as well as by his might. 
In Antiochos' view the victory at Kouropedion had established his right-
eous claim on areas earlier occupied by the defeated king.10 
We may be certain that this was not only Antiochos' view. Part of the land 
acquired by Seleukos after his victory was sold by his son and successor Antio-
chos I to Pitane. Exacdy this land later became the object of dispute between 
Mytilene and Pitane.11 The many documents quoted in the verdict of the Per-
gamene arbitrators (lines 133-144) leave no doubt that the question they had 
asked was whether this transaction was lawful or not (cf. lines l49f.: da<f>a[X — 
|— rqy TT\<S X^P0? ye-y[ew\- —], i.e., whether Pitane had bought the 
land from its lawful owner, in other words whether Seleukos' victory at Kouro-
pedion (line 132:ZeXeuKo[u Tfji Trpos-] Aixrfuaxov \iaxy\i emkpaTTjcravTos') 
had made him and his successors lawful owners of the land and therefore gave 
them the right to sell it. The Pergamene judges recognized this right, which 
had already been confirmed earlier by Philetairos and Eumenes I. We see that 
10. The negotiations between the Romans and Antiochos has often been the subject o f detailed 
analysis. See esp. A . Mehl, art. cit. (note 3), p. 173-7 (with earlier bibliography). 
11. Ager, Arbitration, no. 146, lines 130-50; cf. L. Boffo, art. cit. (note 2), p. 239f. This has been 
overlooked by A . Mehl, art. cit. 
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in a comparable dispute both the Pergamene rulers and the Pergamene judges 
applied exactly the principle that Antiochos was defending against the Roman 
claims: The victory at Kouropedion had made his house the legitimate owner 
of the territory previously owned by Lysimachos. When Antiochos I sold part 
of this land to Pitane he did so as the legitimate owner and the subsequent 
claims of Pitane were valid, as deriving from this legitimate transaction. 
But if violence constitutes a legitimate form of acquisition of property, then 
why did Antiochos deny this right to the Romans? In order to answer this ques-
tion we have to turn our attention again to other pieces of evidence that show 
that the specific circumstances of the conquest made a world of a difference. 
The exact circumstances of conquest 
How the circumstances of the conquest affected the legitimacy of owner-
ship through victory in war can been seen, again, in the case of Amphipolis. 
Aeschines claimed that a treaty which Amyntas had drawn up upon oath 
awarded the city to the Athenians; however, the resistance of the Amphipoli-
tans prevented the Athenians from taking control of the city. In 360 Perdiccas, 
Philips brother, conquered Amphipolis, but after his death (359) Philip relin-
quished control over the city to avoid challenging Athenian claims. The city 
managed to retain its autonomy until Philip reconquered it in 357. Aeschines 
explains the arguments of the Athenians that were more than just a technicality: 
If you argue that you reasonably possess Amphipolis by having taken it in war, if 
you had won the city with spear fighting against us, then you would be the sove-
reign owner (Kuptaj? exei?) having acquired it according to the law of war. But 
if you have taken the city of the Athenians from the Amphipolitans, then you do 
not possess their property, but the territory of the Athenians.12 
Not unlike Antiochos, Aeschines does not question the right of conquest. 
On the contrary, he admits that the Philip's right of conquest was consistent 
with "the law of war". What undermined Philips claim on the city was the 
fact that Philip had taken Amphipolis not from its lawful owners (the Athe-
nians), but from the Amphipolitans. Antiochos argued along the same lines: 
his ancestors had never lost their territories in an open war with the Ptolemies 
or with Philip V. They were "robbed" in a moment in which they had their 
attention deflected elsewhere.13 
12. Aesch. 2.33: el 8' dvriiroiei icaTd Tr6Xe(iov Xaffcoi' elKo-ras e?xeii', el \iev Trpo? fp.as 
TOXe^aas 8opidXwToi> Tf\v TT6XIV elxes, Kvplus etxe? TU TOO iroXejiou v6\iui KTricrd^ei/os" 
el 8' 'AiicfHTroXlTa? d<f>e[Xoii Tf|v 'A9Tivalioi> ir6Xiv, ov ra eKelvuv elxe?, dXXd JT\V 'AOniwlue 
Xupav. 
13. This was rightly pointed out by E. Bickermann, "Bellum Antiochicum", Hermes, 67, 1932, 
p. 50-3. 
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That this was not a technicality or a rhetorical device can be inferred from 
a similar situation with regard to Philip's claims on Halonnesos, which had 
previously belonged to the Athenians. When Philip took the island defeating 
the pirates who had occupied it, this did not affect the Athenian claim on the 
island. For this reason Demosthenes insisted that Philip should not "give", but 
"return" the island to the Athenians.14 Giving is the right of the lawful owner, 
and Philip was not the rightful owner. 
The Hellenistic documentary sources contain more examples of this kind 
of argument. The conflict between Nagidos and Arsinoe over a territory pro-
vides a characteristic example of the consistent application of this principle. 
The Nagideis give their version of the controversy in a decree (lines 19-27): 
When Aetos, son of Apollonios, a citizen of Aspendos and of our own city, became 
a general in Kilikia, he occupied a suitable site and founded a city by the name of 
Arsinoe, named after the king's mother. He settled new settlers here and he divi-
ded the land, which was ours {jr\v x^pav [...] ovaav f)ueTepa[v]), expelling the 
barbarians who had been inhabiting it (jobs evwe[io\yo\ievov" fSapPdpous-). And 
now his son Thraseas, who has been sent by the king as a general in Kilikia, shows 
great zeal in his efforts to make the city more glorious, and he has asked us to give 
up (emxcopfiaai) the public land (nf)v x"Pai/ Stiuoatai/, sc. our public land) 
to the inhabitants, so that they may possess it (trfeiv]) for all time, they and their 
descendants.15 
As we may see, Nagidos regarded a territory as its lawful property although 
it had been occupied by barbarians. When a Ptolemaic general expelled these 
barbarians, occupied the land, and founded a new city there, the Nagideis still 
regarded this land as their own public land. From their point of view, they had 
never lost ownership, despite these changes, presumably because they had not 
lost this land after a defeat in (a just) war. 
The dispute between Samos and Priene over a strip of land called Bati-
netis is very similar.16 When king Lysimachos was asked to arbitrate in 283/2, 
the disputed territory was in the possession of the Samians, but the Prienians 
claimed that it had originally belonged to them. They had temporarily lost it in 
the 7th century BC, during the Cimmerian invasion under Lygdamis, but after 
a period of three years the land was "returned" to them. It is crucial to observe 
here the emphasis the Prieniens place on the word "return" (dTro8i86vcu). 
A conflict between Mytilene and Pitane may present a similar case. As we have 
seen, Pitane had bought a disputed territory from Antiochos I, who had inher-
ited it from Seleukos I; the latter had occupied it after his victory over Lysima-
14. Dem. 7.5; 12.14; cf. Aesch. 3.83. 
15. SEGXXXJX 1426; Ager, Arbitration, no. 42. For a new edition of the text see G . Feed, "Das 
Inschriftendossier zur Neugrundung von Arsinoe in Kilikien: Textkorrekturen", Epigraphica Anatol-
ica, 139, 2002, p. 83-8 (with the earlier bibliography). 
16. Ager, Arbitration, no. 74 I. 
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chos. If the Mytileneans could still claim this land as their own, it was possi-
bly because Seleukos had not conquered it from them, but from Lysimachos. 
Not every military victory established legal claims. The circumstances 
of the conquest were in important factor that was seriously taken into 
consideration. 
The justification of violence 
Finally, there is yet another parameter that plays an important part in the 
arguments presented by the conflicting parties: was the war that led to the con-
quest unprovoked or unjust? Conquest in general did not create the right of 
ownership, but only violence undertaken as a result of provocation or as venge-
ance for injustice.17 Although the Magnesian judges, Thucydides or Xenophon 
(see above § 1) did not make such a distinction, the legitimacy of the act of vio-
lence appears to have played a key role. The fact that the Greeks, both in legend 
and in historical documents, tried to present just causes is clearly related to this 
principle, on which Babrius {Fab. 99) has given his ironical comment: 
Once a wolf saw a lamb that had gone astray from the flock, but instead of rushing 
upon him to seize him by force, he tried to find a plausible complaint (?YKXr|ua 
ewpoawTrov) by which to justify his hostility. "Last year, small though you were, 
you slandered me." "How could I last year? It's not yet a year since I was born." 
"Well, then, aren't you cropping this field, which is mine?" "No, for I've not yet 
eaten any grass nor have I begun to graze." "And haven't you drunk from the foun-
tain which is mine to drink from?" "No, even yet my mother's breast provides my 
nourishment". Thereupon the wolf seized the lamb and while eating him remar-
ked: "You're not going to rob the wolf of his dinner even though you do find it 
easy to refute all my charges" (Trdcmv amT|v). 
One finds evidence for this differentiation in Demosthenes' Against Ctesi-
phon, where the orator denounces Philips aggression: the Macedonian king 
had won by the spear some of the cities of the Athenians, "without having first 
suffered injustice at the hands of the Athenian people."18 The orator is not 
criticizing conquest in general, but unjustified, unprovoked conquest (ou8ev 
Trpoa8iKT|0eLs'). The importance of this distinction can be seen in a docu-
ment of an entirely different nature, a curse tablet deposited in a grave in 
Oropos. An anonymous man curses a series of persons, hoping that the gods 
of the underworld would respond to his request and punish his opponents 
precisely because he had been wronged without having wronged them first.19 
17. Cf. E. BickermannandJ. Sykoutris, Speusipps Brief an Konig Philipp, Leipzig, 1928, p. 27f. 
18. Dem. 18.181 (pv&kv TrpoaSiioiOeis imo TOU 6r|uou TO© 'h8y\vaii>sv). 
19. /. Oropos 745a, lines 25-8 ( S E G X L V H 510): d?tdk ohv doiKO%evos KOI oinc d8iK(Sv| 
Trporepos, emTeXlfl] yeviofia<i> & KaraypAfa. Cf. Xen., Hell. 2.2.10: ov nucopouuevoi [...] 
r|6iKouv. 
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This idea persisted until the late Hellenistic period. When envoys of Hierapy-
tna appeared before the Roman senate to defend their claims over a disputed 
territory, they made sure to mention the fact that they had not attacked or 
wronged their adversary, Itanos.20 
Legitimate violence: 
the importance of making distinctions 
Let me summarize the three points made so far: 
1) Violent occupation of land or property was regarded as a legitimate form 
of acquisition of property, no less legitimate than inheritence, purchase or 
donation. 
2) When the parties to a conflict based their claims on different arguments, 
neither the arbitrators nor the adversaries gave priority to a certain type of 
argument over another (e.g., inheritence over conquest), but determined a 
terminus a quo for the possession. 
3) The exact conditions of the act of violence were important factors. Two 
questions played an important part: Did the conquest take place in a direct 
confrontation between the owner and the aggressor? Was the war justified? 
These distinctions, which were consistently made from the mid-fourth cen-
tury BC onwards, in no way limited the validity of violence as a basis for prop-
erty claims in international law. The right of conquest was not questioned or 
criticized. What was questioned were the circumstances, not the principle. 
The principle that the violent conquest of foreign land establishes a legiti-
mate ownership is therefore neither a literary fiction, nor a Hellenistic inno-
vation, nor an arbitrary claim made by the Magnesian judges. This idea was 
connected with the belief that success in a violent activity (war, piracy, or raid) 
cannot be achieved without the support of the gods and may be viewed as the 
punishment of the defeated party. The most instructive example of a defeat 
in war seen as punishment for unjust behavior is that of Athens' defeat in the 
Peloponnesian War. As Xenophon explains, the Athenians believed they suf-
fered not for the punishment they inflicted on others, but for the injustices 
they committed through their own arrogance.21 
20. Ager, Arbitration, no. 158 I, lines 6-8 (/. Cret. Ill iv 10): 'lTdi'ioi ydp d8ncr|udTcoi> \iv\ yivo-
ii<f>'] f|uuiv ain-ois, urro 8£ | hrfe T&V] Kvinoiw [TOIAEC!)? wre, ITOXEUOV dirapdvyfXTOi' 
i)\iiv €TTO r\oav |[...]ical dSucf|uaTa Ww£v] efcTeXtoavro. Some vague references to the unjust 
or unlawful occupation of a territory may in fact be connected with this line of argument. See, 
e.g., the conflict between Narthakion and Melitaia (Ager, Arbitration, no. 156 lines 23f.: kavr&v 
dSiKus | [eiroif|cavT]o). 
21. Xen., Hell. 2.2.10: TTaOeiv d oil Tiuupoujievoi eTToLnaav, dXXd Sid ijfjptv I"|81KOUV. 
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Divine support for acts of piracy is implicilty recognized in the custom of 
dedicating a tithe of the booty to the gods - a thanksgiving dedication cor-
responding to the idea of do ut des.n A n interesting appeal to this principle 
is found in the arguments made by the Samians in a conflict with Priene 
over the fort Karion and the region called Dryoussa.23 Their claim was con-
firmed through the 'verdict of their victory' in a batde against the Prienians 
(lines 105 f . : ueTd 8£ T & V T r a p d T a f i v TCLV yevouevav a u T o l ? T T O T I npiavet? 
em ApiA icai VIKCLS Kp'ioiv exeiv)?"1 
In the Hellenistic period in particular the idea that violence (in the form of 
victory in war) establishes rights was strengthened through its connection with 
the ideology of Hellenistic monarchy.25 A prayer in Pergamon for the success 
of King Attalos III expresses, e.g., the wish that the gods give him victory and 
success not only in his defensive wars {amynomenot), but also in his offensive 
wars {archonti)".26 
22. e.g., Meiggs-Lewis, GHI, 16; Herod. 3.47. 
23. Ager, Arbitration, no. 74 I. 
24. For the "verdict of battle" cf. Polyb. 13.3.4: TT\U etc Xeipo? Kai awrrdST|v yivo[ievr\v \iax<)v 
dXriOiWii/ {rrreXdnfiavov elvai Kptaif trpayiidTOi' (with regard to the Lelantian War). 
25. But see also the critical remarks by A . Mehl, art. cit. (note 3). 
26. /. Pergamon 246, line 31. 
